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Hedging the IRS-A Policy Justification for

Excluding Liability and Insurance Proceeds
Jeffrey H. Kahnt
Uncertainty about tax results is an ever-present obstacle ,to business
transactions despite the extensive number of Internal Revenue Code sections
and Treasury Regulations. Some insurance companies now provide an
insuranceproduct to protect taxpayers against adverse tax consequencesfrom
proposed transactions. Ironically, this new insurance product, labeled "tax
insurance,"poses uncertain tax consequences itself This Article argues that if
the adverse tax consequences arise (that is, the taxpayer has additional tax
liability) and the insurance company is contractually required to cover that
liability, the tax insuranceproceeds are not includable in the insured's gross
income. As part of the reasoning that underlies this conclusion concerning tax
insurance, the Article examines and develops a novel approach that provides a
tax policy justificationfor excluding general liability insuranceproceedsfrom
the insured's income. The Article concludes that the same justification also
applies to exclude tax insuranceproceedsfrom the insured'sgross income. The
Article also examines whether the premiums paid for tax insurance coverage
are deductible business expenses. Finally, the Article examines the appropriate
tax treatmentof other types of tax indemnity arrangements.
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Introduction
Despite-or perhaps on account of-the incredibly complex nature of our
tax laws, individuals and business organizations face uncertainty as to the tax
results of many transactions. Congress and the Internal Revenue Service,' even
if they so desired, could not set out rules in sufficient detail to provide certainty
as to every possible transaction that may arise in the future. 2 Unless alleviated,
this uncertainty will cause some taxpayers to avoid engaging in transactions
that would otherwise benefit society or the economy, resulting in a deadweight
loss. Thus, it is desirable to derive ways to eliminate or mitigate this
uncertainty in order to avoid deterring financially and socially beneficial
3
transactions.
Taxpayers frequently are faced with a choice of either abandoning a
project or proceeding with it and accepting the question of the tax liability as
one of the risks of the venture. Insurance companies have seen this
circumstance as presenting an opportunity for them to enter the market and
provide a useful service. To that end, some companies now provide insurance
to protect a taxpayer against adverse tax consequences from a proposed
transaction.4
If an insured client does not receive the tax treatment for which he
purchased insurance and thereby collects from the insurance company an

I

Hereinafter referred to as the "Service."

2
Kyle D. Logue, Tax Law Uncertainty and the Role ofTax Insurance, 25 VA. TAX REv. 339,
343 (2005) ("One might surmise that the natural solution to the problem of tax law uncertainty would be
for the government-either Congress or the Treasury Department-to clarify the law in advance so that
such uncertainty does not exist. It simply is not possible, however, to eliminate substantive tax law
uncertainty for every conceivable business transaction.").
3
Id. at 370-71 ("What this means is that legal risk is something that most people would pay to
avoid, which in turn means that social welfare would be enhanced if legal risk could be reduced or
eliminated at a cost less than what people are willing to pay to shed it.").
4
1 refer to privately provided tax risk insurance as "tax insurance" throughout the Article
although such products have also been given other names (e.g., tax liability insurance, tax indemnity

insurance, and tax risk transactional insurance).
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amount equal to the additional taxes he is required to pay the Service, what is
the tax consequence of his receiving that payment? While the Service
apparently has not yet challenged a taxpayer's treatment of tax insurance
proceeds, one possible explanation for the absence of litigation is that taxpayers
are voluntarily reporting it as income. 5 In any event, anyone considering the
purchase of tax insurance will want to take into account the extent to which
there is a risk that payments received pursuant to the policy will themselves be
taxed.6 The purpose of this Article is to examine that issue and several related
topics.
Part I of this Article briefly explains and reviews the history of tax
insurance and its predecessors. Part I1 examines the treatment of insurance
proceeds received because of the damage or destruction suffered by an insured
item of property 7 and also discusses the tax treatment of liability insurance.8 In
this Part, the Article will propose a policy justification for the tax law's
treatment of the receipt of proceeds from property insurance
•
9and from liability
insurance, including a discussion of Clark v. Commissioner and its progeny.
The treatment of those insurance proceeds constitutes the backdrop against
which my analysis of the proper treatment of tax insurance rests.
Part III examines whether the proceeds of a tax insurance policy are to be
taxed to the recipient and whether premiums paid for a tax policy are
deductible. Part IV considers the proper tax treatment of payments made by a
seller pursuant to a guaranty that the seller made as to how the buyer will be
taxed in connection with the purchased item. Part V considers the proper tax
treatment of payments received from a third party, such as a broker, who
guaranteed a specific tax result to induce the taxpayer to invest in a venture.
Finally, Part VI sets forth a summary of my conclusions.

5

See infra Part I.B.

6
As described below, the parties have incorporated coverage for that risk by including in tax
insurance contracts a gross-up provision to insulate the insured from any additional taxes that might be
imposed because of the insurance payment.
7
The Article refers to this type of insurance as "property insurance."
8
In this Article, the term "liability insurance" refers to insurance that will satisfy a liability of
the insured that might arise upon the occurrence or nonoccurrence of specified events. This Article does
not discuss life insurance because the tax treatment of the receipt of life insurance proceeds invokes
additional policy considerations that do not apply to tax insurance. For a brief discussion of the policy
considerations involved in the taxation of life insurance, see Jeffrey H. Kahn, The Mirage of
Equivalence and the Ethereal Principles of Parallelismand HorizontalEquity, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 645,

681-83 (2006).
9
40 B.T.A. 333 (1939), acq. in result, 1957-1 C.B. 4; see infra Part II.C.
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I. Tax Insurance-An Overview

A. Old Marketfor Insurance Against Tax Uncertainty
Although tax insurance is a relatively recent phenomenon, 1° insuring

against uncertainty in the tax law is not. Those arrangements that first came
into use prior to the insurance companies' entrance into the field are sometimes
referred to in this Article as "old market." ' 1 Old market techniques are still
available. As detailed below, several options exist that differ in their degrees of
coverage.
One means of eliminating tax result uncertainty is to have the government

provide an opinion ex ante on what the tax results would be for a specific
proposed transaction. In fact, the government provides this type of "insurance"
by offering to issue private letter rulings about the tax treatment that will be
applied to proposed transactions. The Service issues private letter rulings

directly to a requesting taxpayer, thereby, "in effect, guaranteeing with some
limitations a particular tax treatment for a particular transaction. ' 12 As
discussed below, 13 it can be difficult to obtain timely rulings on proposed

transactions. 14
Another example of old market insurance is tax return preparers'

provision of warranties for their clients. These warranties generally state that
the preparer will indemnify the client for any interest and penalties caused by
the preparer's mistake.' 5 Thus, the risk of penalties and interest is shifted from
16
the client to the preparer so long as the conditions of the warranty are met.
The Service has not yet demonstrated any concern over the granting of this
type of warranty, presumably because it appears that such warranties do not

10

See, e.g., Kenneth A. Gary, New Opportunityfor Tax Lawyers: Insuring Tax Transactions,

104 TAX NOTES 26 (2004).

11
Professor Logue used the term "old market" to describe commercial options that were used
before the advent of tax insurance to cover tax transaction risk. The term "new market" refers to thirdparty tax insurance. Logue, supra note 2, at 376, 387.
12
Logue, supra note 2, at 343. While the ruling applies only to the requesting taxpayer,
private letter rulings must be open to the public. I.R.C. § 6110(a) (2008).
13 See infra note 32.
14 See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 2007-7, 2007-1 C.B. 228 ("A 'comfort' ruling will not be issued with
respect to an issue that is clearly and adequately addressed by statute, regulations, decisions of a court,
tax treaties, revenue rulings, or revenue procedures absent extraordinary circumstances (e.g., a request
for a ruling required by a governmental regulatory authority in order to effectuate the transaction).").
Also, time constraints may make a request for a ruling impractical because of the time that elapses
between the request and the receipt of the ruling.
15 Note that the preparer does not agree to cover the actual underpayment of the tax. Logue,
supra note 2, at 377.
16 There is an issue as to whether this is truly a risk shift since the warranty covers only the
amount of "damages" caused by the tax return preparer's error. That is, the tax return preparer is likely
already at risk for amounts due on account of the preparer's mistakes. However, this warranty may shift
the risk for amounts due on account of a tax return preparer's error that does not rise to the level of
malpractice or negligence (and thus would not allow recovery under normal legal considerations).
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increase the amount of noncompliance by taxpayers.' 7 The proper tax treatment
of payments made pursuant to such warranties is discussed in Part IV.
Warranties may also be provided to clients of tax advisors-that is, tax
attorneys and accountants who may both advise clients on how to structure a
transaction and provide an opinion on the tax consequences of a proposed
transaction. 18 Unlike tax return preparer warranties, these warranties generally
do not indemnify the client for any type of payment that the client ultimately is
required to make to the Service. That is, they do not cover the actual
underpayment itself, nor any interest or penalties that may be due. Instead, the
warranty covers the payment made to the advisor for the specific advice. As
Professor Logue has noted, these warranties "take the form of a money-back
guarantee: if the particular issue on which the advisor gave an opinion ends up
being challenged on audit and rejected by the Service and a court, the advisor
agrees to refund some or all of the fees that were charged for the advice." 19 The
proper tax treatment of such refunds is discussed in Part IV.
Unmistakably, through two separate devices, the government has
expressed its hostility to tax advisor warranty arrangements and has indicated
the need for their oversight. First, Circular 230 2 0 -a collection of regulations
published by the Service that contain rules "governing the recognition of
attorneys, certified public accountants, enrolled agents, and other persons
representing taxpayers before the Internal Revenue Service" 2]_specifically
prohibits payment via "contingent fees" for work on an original tax return.
"Contingent fees" include:
[A] fee arrangement in which the practitioner will reimburse the client for all or
a portion of the client's fee in the event that a position taken on a return or other
filing is challenged by the Internal Revenue Service or is not sustained, whether

17
Logue, supra note 2, at 380 ("[A]lthough the use of tax preparers may have some negative
effects on taxpayer compliance (as well as some positive effects), there is no obvious compliance cost or
benefit associated with the warranties per se. That is, the existence of these warranties probably does not
by itself create an incentive for insured taxpayers to take overly aggressive positions on their tax
returns."). Since the warranties only cover amounts due because of the tax return preparer's error, it is
unlikely that they have any effect on the positions taken by taxpayers.
18
In his article, Professor Logue describes the difference between "tax advisors" and "tax
return preparers":
By "tax advisor" here I mean someone who advises a taxpayer regarding (a) how to structure a
given transaction so as to minimize taxes, and then (b) how to report that transaction on the
taxpayer's return. The advisor therefore is providing expertise on the tax law as it applies to a
particular situation and is involved in so-called tax planning. By "tax return preparer" I mean
someone who fills out the tax return itself. Obviously, the preparer may give some legal
advice on how to report certain issues; thus, the distinction does not always hold up. One can
still usefully distinguish, however, between the H&R Blocks of the world and the lawyers and
accountants that give more specialized transactional advice on specific issues, usually to
corporate or wealthy individual taxpayers.
Id. at 382 n.82.
19
Id. at 383.
20
31 C.F.R. §§ 10.0-10.93 (2008).
21
Id. § 10.0 (2008).
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pursuant to an indemnity agreement,
22 a guarantee, rescission rights, or any other
arrangement with a similar effect.

Second, the Treasury requires disclosure from every taxpayer who
participates in certain transactions, labeled "reportable transactions. ' '23 While
"[t]he fact that a transaction is a reportable transaction shall not affect the legal
determination of whether the taxpayer's treatment of the transaction is
proper, ' 24 it is clear that the Service will subject reportable transactions to extra
scrutiny. This reporting requirement will discourage the adoption of those
transactions since no taxpayer desires to red-flag his return. One form of
reportable transactions is "transactions with contractual protection." This term
is defined broadly enough to cover the situation where there
is a potential
25
results.
tax
promised
the
disallow
Service
the
should
refund
As noted above, there does not appear to be any government hostility to
tax preparer warranties. 26 Despite some similarities between the two types of
warranties, the difference in governmental oversight appears justified because
the nature of the markets for the two products is different. Tax return preparers
generally deal with the completion and filing of basic tax returns, and the
warranty itself, which covers only mistakes made by the preparer, does not
appear to encourage abusive reporting. On the other hand, tax advisors
sometimes sell sophisticated tax shelters, and contingent pricing may
encourage more taxpayers to engage in those transactions. The problem of
taxpayers attempting to play the audit lottery 27 is more severe in the tax advisor
situation. Whether or not that distinction is valid, however, is not the focus of
this Article. Instead, I will discuss the possible tax consequences that attend the
adoption of such insurance provisions.

22 Id. § 10.27(c)(1). Contingent fees are allowed in connection with advice or preparation of
an amended return. Id. § 10.27(b)(2). The difference in treatment is justified because the Service is
concerned with taxpayers and advisors betting on the audit lottery for aggressive positions. The term
"audit lottery" refers to taking a questionable position on a tax return in the hope that the return will not
be selected for audit. With amended returns, however, the Service is not concerned that the return will
slip through the cracks and not be scrutinized for aggressive positions.
23 Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(a) (2008).
24 Id.
25 Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(4) (2008) states:
A transaction with contractual protection is a transaction for which the taxpayer or a related
party (as described in section 267(b) or 707(b)) has the right to a full or partial refund of fees
(as described in paragraph (b)(4)(ii) of this section) if all or part of the intended tax
consequences from the transaction are not sustained. A transaction with contractual protection
also is a transaction for which fees (as described in paragraph (b)(4)(ii) of this section) are
contingent on the taxpayer's realization of tax benefits from the transaction. All the facts and
circumstances relating to the transaction will be considered when determining whether a fee is
refundable or contingent, including the right to reimbursements of amounts that the parties to
the transaction have not designated as fees or any agreement to provide services without
reasonable compensation.
26 Circular 230 does not address tax preparer warranties, and such provisions are not covered
under the reportable transactions requirement.
27 See supra note 22, § 10.27(c)(1).
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The final "old market" tax risk-shifting device is the standard tax
indemnity agreement. These agreements are common in the sale and purchase
of businesses, which routinely involve both tax and non-tax contingent
liabilities that the contracting parties allocate as they see fit. Indemnification is
sometimes provided by a broker who seeks to induce a prospective buyer to
consummate a sale. Indemnification agreements are also used in certain divorce
settlements. The Service has not indicated 28
hostility to, or a need for oversight
of, this type of indemnification "insurance."
B. New Market-Tax Insurance
The invention and increased popularity of tax insurance should not come
as a surprise. An expert in the field estimated that approximately forty to fifty
policies are issued each year, and over half of tax insurance applications are
refused.29 Tax insurance clients are primarily
business entities, and the tax
30
liability coverage is usually quite large.
Tax insurance is a natural evolution from the old market of insurance
options, especially as to tax indemnity agreements. Instead of shifting liability
risks between contracting parties, such as a buyer, seller, or broker, tax
insurance shifts the tax uncertainty risk as to the consequences of a transaction
to a neutral third party for a fee. 31 Since it can be difficult or even impossible to
get a private letter ruling from the Service, the market for tax insurance has
expanded.32

28
Logue, supra note 2, at 385-87.
29
Telephone Interview with Roy Reynolds, Managing Partner, Risk Capital Partners (Sept.
19, 2008). The number of issued policies has remained steady over the past few years. However,
because of the significant changes in accounting for income taxes found in Financial Accounting
Standards Board Interpretation 48 ("FIN 48"), there is reason to believe that the number of tax insurance
policies will rise. FIN 48 could greatly increase the disclosure by firms of risky tax positions. See
Jennifer Blouin et al., What Can We Learn about Uncertain Tax Benefitsfrom FIN 48?, 60 NAT'L TAX
J. 521, 525 (2007) ("The most controversial aspect of FIN 48, from corporations' point of view, is the
requirement for detailed disclosure of the reserve for uncertain tax benefits. Disclosure requirements
were substantially increased under FIN 48."). This increase in disclosure may lead to an increased desire
to reassure investors and shareholders that risky tax positions are covered by tax insurance. Telephone
Interview with Roy Reynolds, supra.
30
One expert estimated the smallest insurance policy with which he was involved was a
potential $2.5 million liability. The largest policy covered a potential $500 million tax liability.
Telephone Interview with Roy Reynolds, supranote 29.
31
Logue, supra note 2, at 386. The mergers and acquisitions area is the primary source for
tax insurance policies. In many cases, the insurance would be used in place of tax escrow accounts that
buyers and sellers would otherwise set up as part of an acquisition or merger. Telephone Interview with
Roy Reynolds, supra note 29.
32
The turnaround time for tax insurance can be as quick as one to two weeks. Gregory
Taggart, Take Me Out of the Ball Game, BLOOMBERG WEALTH MANAGER, June 2005, at 37, 39. In
comparison, in 2005 the Service instituted an "expedited" ruling program in which taxpayers with
certain qualified issues could receive a ruling ten weeks from the Service's receipt of the request. Rev.
Proc. 2005-68, 2005-2 C.B. 694. The length of time is not, however, the only issue. The Service refuses
to provide any ruling on a large number of proposed transactions. Rev. Proc. 2008-3, 2008-1 I.R.B. 110.
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If a client seeks insurance that a proposed transaction will receive a
specified tax treatment, the insurer will refer the request to a panel of tax
experts who are employed by the insurer to evaluate the client's position. 33 The
panel will then determine the likelihood of the client's receiving the desired tax
treatment. Presumably, the insurance companies will be conservative in
34
evaluating the probable tax consequences because their assets are at risk.
They will either refuse to provide insurance or will set the premium for it
according to the panel's evaluation of the probability of an adverse tax result.
Private letter rulings are the closest analogy to the tax insurance product,
but in the latter case the protection is provided by a third-party insurer instead
of by the government. 35 In effect, by issuing a private letter ruling, the
government assumes the taxpayer's risk of not having correctly predicted the
tax consequences of a proposed transaction. Like most old market products, tax
insurance contracts usually cover one specific transaction. 36 Generally, tax
insurance indemnifies the insured for both the actual underpayment and for any
interest and penalties due, subject to contractual limits and deductibles.
There is some question whether the government should be concerned
about-and therefore regulate-the tax insurance market. Proponents of tax
insurance (and nonregulation thereof) argue that since insurance companies
will not insure high-risk transactions, tax insurance is beneficial to the
government because an approval from insurance companies will signal a
legitimate tax position and thereby lighten the Service's auditing
responsibilities. 37 Indeed, it is plausible that insurance companies would be
even more conservative in approving a transaction than the Service would be.
While it is likely that tax insurance could lead unregulated taxpayers to take
more aggressive tax positions since the liability for those positions has been
shifted to a third party, the reporting of the transaction must obtain the approval
of the insurer, who will have a strong financial reason to veto overly aggressive
positions. 38 In effect, the insurer serves as a surrogate for the government in
overseeing that the transaction is taxed properly.
For example, the Service refuses to rule on whether a proposed nonrecognition corporate spin-off is
done for a business purpose or meets the device test requirement of Internal Revenue Code
§ 355(a)(1)(B). Rev. Proc. 2003-48, 2003-2 C.B. 86. Sometimes, however, taxpayers seek tax insurance
coverage even in instances where they also have private letter rulings from the Service. Telephone
Interview with Roy Reynolds, supra note 29.
33
Taggart, supra note 32, at 40.
34
Gary, supra note 10, at 27.

35
Unlike private letter rulings, which cost a flat amount for each request (differentiated by
the subject matter of the ruling), tax insurance premiums are variable and are based on the risk involved
with the covered transaction.
36
The one old market exception is the tax preparer warranty, which covers the entire return.
37

The government has relied on a third-party verification of the bona fides of a transaction in

other tax areas. See Kahn, supra note 8; see also Leandra Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps: The Roles
Third Parties Play in Tax Compliance, 60 STAN. L. REv. 695 (2007) (discussing the importance of

third-party behavior and reporting for fostering tax compliance).
38

See Telephone Interview with Roy Reynolds, supra note 29 (stating that more than half of

all tax insurance applications are rejected).
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Initially, in temporary regulations, the government included transactions
covered by tax insurance under "reportable transactions." 39 After objections
from the insurance industry, the government backed down: the final regulations
do not include such transactions on the list of what must be disclosed.4 °
The benefits and costs of tax insurance (and whether a regulatory response
is desirable) are not the focus of this Article. 41 This Article addresses the tax
consequences to the insured should the insurance company end up paying on
the insurance contract. An analysis of this issue has not yet been fully
developed in any article. 42 Insurance companies have protected taxpayers from
the risk of incurring a tax on the insurance payouts by providing a "gross-up"
provision in the insurance contract so that the insurer will not only pay the
covered liability but also gross-up the coverage amount to cover the taxes due
on all its payments. 43 The function of this provision is to make the taxpayer
whole on an after-tax basis. Obviously, this type of provision would not be
necessary if it were settled that the insurance payment is nontaxable to the
insured. Since the issue has not yet been formally resolved, insurance
companies have offered to add protection from that risk to the tax insurance
policies for an increased premium amount.
Before addressing the issue of the taxation of tax insurance proceeds, it is
useful to review (1) the tax treatment of insurance proceeds received because of
the damage suffered by an insured item of property; (2) the tax treatment of
payments made pursuant to a liability insurance contract; and (3) the policy
justifications for those treatments.
II. Property and Liability Insurance

A.

Tax Treatment of Receipt of Damages and Proceedsfrom Propertyor
Liability Insurance

If a tortfeasor reimburses a taxpayer for damage to the taxpayer's
property, the taxpayer includes the reimbursement in income only to the extent
that the payment exceeds the taxpayer's basis in the damaged property.44 The

39
Logue, supra note 2, at 401.
40
Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b) (2008).
41
For discussion of these benefits and costs, see Logue, supra note 2.
42
Id. at 388-89 n.92; see also Richard A. Wolfe, Tax Indemnity Insurance: A Valuable and
Evolving Tool for Managing Tax Risks, 739 PLI/TAx 371,425-34 (2006).
43
See Logue, supra note 2, at 388. Tax insurance policies are offered either with a gross-up
provision or without. Apparently, most clients choose to buy the gross-up provision. The charge for the
gross-up provision is applied at the same rate as the underlying liability. Thus, the insurance companies
are not discounting the gross-up amount. Telephone Interview with Roy Reynolds, supra note 29.
44
See Raytheon Prod. Corp. v. Comm'r, 144 F.2d 110, 114 (1st Cir. 1944); BORiS I.
BITTKER, MARTIN J. MCMAHON, JR. & LAWRENCE A. ZELENAK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
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excess reimbursement is realized income, but the taxpayer may elect to defer
the recognition of that amount if the taxpayer reinvests in similar property
within a specified time period.45
Superficially, with respect to damaged personally-used property, the
treatment of excluding the reimbursement to the extent of the property's basis
might appear to be overly taxpayer-friendly. 46 If the taxpayer were not
reimbursed by any party for damage to personally-used property, the taxpayer
would be allowed to deduct the loss-up to the amount of the taxpayer's
basis-under the casualty and theft loss provision. 47 However, that deduction is
subject to several limitations that often prevent the taxpayer from deducting the
full amount of his loss. 4 8 By excluding from income damages received up to
the amount of the taxpayer's basis in the damaged property, the Internal
Revenue Code 49 effectively allows the taxpayer a deduction equal to the full
amount of the basis without limitation. What then is the justification for this
treatment?
The justification for the exclusion of damages is similar to the justification
for taxing the amount received on a voluntary sale of property only to the
extent it exceeds the taxpayer's adjusted basis. While the tortfeasor does not

actually purchase the property, the involuntary conversion of all or part of the
property into cash is similar to a forced sale. On a sale, the amount received
that does not exceed the taxpayer's basis is a return of capital, and so is not
treated as income. The damages received from a tortfeasor that do not exceed

the taxpayer's basis also are a return of capital 50 -- that is, a return of the dollars

INDIVIDUALS

3.04 (3d ed. 2002); see also DOUGLAS A. KAHN & JEFFREY H. KAHN, FEDERAL INCOME

TAX 77-78 (5th ed. 2005). One exception to this rule is where the taxpayer previously was allowed a
deduction for the loss and the tax benefit rule applied. KAHN & KAHN, supra, at 183-87. For purposes of
this Article, I will assume that no deduction was claimed.
45
I.R.C. § 1033 (2000 & Supp. 2005).
46
See, e.g., Daniel Halperin, Valuing Personal Consumption: Cost Versus Value and the
Impact of Insurance, I FLA. TAX REV. 1, 29 (1992) ("Ultimately of course, it might seem unfair to
include the recovery in income without allowing a deduction for the loss which the recovery reimburses.
But this justification for the exclusion of recoveries appears inconsistent with no deduction for
uninsured losses.").
47
I.R.C. § 165(c)(3) (2000). These losses are sometimes referred to as "personal casualty
loss[es]." I.R.C. § 165(h)(3) (2000). For a policy discussion of the personal casualty loss deduction, see
Jeffrey H. Kahn, PersonalDeductions-A Tax "Ideal" or Just Another "Deal"?, 2002 L. Rev. M.S.U.D.C.L. 1.
48 The largest limitation on the deductibility of personal casualty losses is that a taxpayer's
net personal casualty loss (the amount that the taxpayer's personal casualty losses exceed the taxpayer's
personal casualty gains) is deductible only to the extent that such loss exceeds ten percent of the
taxpayer's adjusted gross income. I.R.C. § 165(h)(2)(A) (2000). The deduction is also classified as an
itemized deduction and therefore is subject to the limitations placed on that category. See I.R.C.
§ 67(b)(3) (2000).
Hereinafter referred to as the "Code."
49
50
If the property is merely damaged, but not destroyed, the tax law is generous in utilizing all
of the taxpayer's basis in the property instead of apportioning a percentage of the basis equal to the
percentage of the value of the property that was lost. Cf Treas. Reg. § 1.61-6(a) (2008) (if only a portion
of property is sold, only a portion of the basis of the property is allocated to that sale). However, the
current treatment is consistent with the treatment generally accorded in some analogous areas such as
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invested in the property-and therefore the exclusion from income follows the
traditional policy of not taxing such returns. 51 Note that for this purpose, it
makes no difference whether the damages are paid by the tortfeasor directly or
through liability insurance that the tortfeasor had purchased.
Should the tax result be any different if, instead of the tortfeasor's paying
damages, the taxpayer is reimbursed by an insurance company that the taxpayer
paid for coverage of the property that was lost or damaged due to casualty or
theft? In other words, should income include the proceeds received from a
property insurance policy? The established tax treatment of the insured, which I
believe to be proper, is the same for the receipt of property insurance proceeds
as the treatment of damages received from a tortfeasor. The amount received is
excluded from income to the extent that the payment does not exceed the
taxpayer's basis in the property. As with damages paid by a tortfeasor, any
of nonrecognition to
excess amount is income, subject to a taxpayer's election
52
the extent that the taxpayer reinvests in similar property.
As noted above, the tax treatment of a taxpayer who receives
compensation for damaged property does not depend upon whether the amount
is paid by the tortfeasor directly or by an insurance company through liability
coverage. However, another issue concerns the tax treatment of the tortfeasor
who has purchased liability insurance. Should the tortfeasor recognize income
when the insurance company pays the damages? Despite the fact that the
payment satisfies a liability of the tortfeasor, it does not cause the tortfeasor to
realize any income. 53 The payment is made pursuant to a contract with the
insured in which the risk of loss for damages caused by the insured was shifted
to the insurer for a fee that reflects the dollar amount of that risk at the time that
the shift took place.
Now, let us consider whether the exclusions described above are justified
by tax policy.
B. Policy Justificationsfor Exclusionfrom Income
Instead of treating the proceeds from property insurance as a payment on
the property, the proceeds could be regarded as a payment pursuant to an
aleatory contract in which the insured receives a greater amount of money than
he paid the insurer. The loss of property could be regarded as merely the
bargain sales. Compare Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(e) (2008) (providing for no allocation of basis on a
transfer that is in part a sale and in part a gift where the transferee is a private person), with 1.R.C. §
1011 (b) (2000) (requiring that basis be allocated on a transfer that is in part a sale and in part a gift
where the transferee is a charitable organization).

See Kahn, supra note 8, at 659 ("The damages received are not income to the extent of the
51
taxpayer's basis because the dollars received are treated as a replacement of the dollars the taxpayer is
deemed to have invested in the property lost due to the casualty or theft.").
52
I.R.C. § 1033 (2000 & Supp. 2005).
53
BITTKER, MCMAHON & ZELENAK, supra note 44, 3.08.
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measuring device for determining the amount payable by the insured under the
aleatory contract. The difference between what the insured paid the insurer for
the coverage and the amount he receives would then be income to the insured.
If this approach were adopted, the amount paid by the insured might well be
restricted to the amount of the most recent premium he paid rather than the sum
of all premiums paid on the policy. Premiums are not installment payments.
Each premium purchases insurance for a specified period, and when that period
expires, the insurance coverage purchased with the premium expires as well. 4
So, only the last premium paid by the insured is attributable to the insurance
proceeds that the insured receives.
What then is the justification for not taxing the insured on the excess he
receives over the amount he paid for the coverage? 55 One factor favoring
exclusion is the presence of a policy to encourage the purchase of property and
liability insurance, or, at least, a policy that does not discourage the purchase of
property or liability insurance. If property or liability insurance proceeds were
taxable to the insured, the incentive to purchase those policies would be
reduced. Either the insured would net less than the amount of loss he insured,
or the insured would have to pay a higher premium to purchase a gross-up
provision in the policy to pay for the additional tax liability. Congress might
conclude that there are societal benefits to having persons purchase property or
liability insurance so that risks are pooled and thereby shared by a larger
number of persons. In addition, Congress might conclude that it is desirable to
reduce the risks incurred by a single person from a transaction in order not to
deter that person from engaging in socially useful endeavors. While Congress
and the Service may very well favor these policies, and they may have had
some influence on the resolution of how to treat insurance proceeds, there is a
principled justification for the current tax treatment that does not depend upon
the presence of some programmatic goal.56 To understand that principle better,
consider the well-established doctrine of anticipation of income.

54 See Joseph M. Dodge, The Netting of Costs Against Income Receipts (Including Damage
Recoveries) Produced by Such Costs, Without Barring Congress from Disallowing Such Costs, 27 VA.
TAX REV. 297, 340 (2007).

55
Some commentators have described this exception as "perplexing." See, e.g., BITKER,
MCMAHON & ZELENAK, supra note 44, 3.08[l][c].
56 Professor Daniel Halperin theorized that the value of the insurance should be viewed ex
ante, that is, before we know whether the insured will need the use of the insurance. As Professor
Halperin stated:
Under this approach the value of insurance or a dealer warranty could be said to be the price
or premium charged, whether or not the taxpayer recovered on the policy. The purchaser who
insures has merely acquired a more 'reliable,' and hence a more expensive product, no
different than if she had purchased a better quality model.
Halperin, supra note 46, at 29. Some commentators have analogized this to an "excludable bargain
purchase." BITTKER, MCMAHON & ZELENAK, supra note 44, 3.08[l][c].
However, I do not find this justification compelling. The same argument could be used in many
areas where we still end up taxing the proceeds. For example, assume A and B put one chip down on
different numbers on a roulette wheel. Each party has a 1/38 chance of having the roulette ball land on
their number. Thus, ex ante, each party has purchased the same chance of winning. The ball lands on A's
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If a person attempts to give away a right to income, the doctrine of
anticipatory assignment of income can come into play. When applicable, this
doctrine requires that the transferred income be taxed to the transferor when the
income is received or accrued by the transferee. For example, if A, who owns
stock of the X Corporation, transfers to B for no consideration the right to the
dividends on A's stock in X Corporation for the next five years, the dividends
that are paid to B will be taxed as income to A. 57
If instead A sold to B for a fair price the right to dividends for the next five
years, A would have ordinary income for the amount paid by B;" but the
dividends that B received from X would be taxed to B rather than to A. 59 This
treatment is sometimes referred to as the "anticipation of income" doctrine; it is
distinguishable from the anticipatory assignment of income doctrine, which can
apply when the assignor of income receives no or inadequate consideration for
the assignment. Of course, for each dividend that he receives, B can take a
deduction for a portion of the amount that B paid.60 The point is that when B
buys the right to A's income in a bona fide, arm's-length transaction, the right
to the income passes from A to B, and A is no longer subject to tax on that
income. In effect, A is taxed on the present value of the assigned income as
reflected by the amount paid to A for the right to that income, and the amount
received by B in excess of that present value is taxed to B. A is thereby able to
shift to B the incidence of the tax on the amount of assigned income that
accrues in B's hands.
What significance does the anticipation of income doctrine have for the
proper treatment of property insurance proceeds? When an insured purchases
property insurance coverage, he pays the insurer to assume a risk that otherwise
is borne by the insured. The premium paid reflects the current dollar value6 1 of
the risk that is insured plus a fee for the services provided by the insurer.
However, the premium will not equal the sum of these items, because the

number and thus A wins (and B loses). No one would argue that A should not be taxable on that amount
because he received what he paid for (that is, a chance to win).
57
See, e.g., Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940) (holding that when a taxpayer gifted
interest coupons to his son but retained the underlying bond, the interest paid to his son was included in
the father's gross income); see also BITTKER, MCMAHON & ZELENAK, supra note 44, 1 34.03[3]; KAHN
& KAHN, supra note 44, at 723-24.
58 See, e.g., Comm'r v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260 (1958) (holding that the assignment for
consideration of a payment right which extends over a period less than the life of the property results in
the receipt of ordinary income by the assignor); see also KAHN & KAHN, supra note 44, at 732; Charles
S. Lyon & James S. Eustice, Assignment of Income: Fruit and Tree as Irrigated by the P.G. Lake Case,
17 TAX L. REv. 293, 299 (1961).
59
KAHN & KAHN, supra note 44, at 730-31.
60
B would take depreciation deductions each year for the amortization of the amount B paid
toA. See Early v. Comm'r, 445 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1971); Gist v. United States, 423 F.2d 1118 (9th Cir.
1970).
61
There is no term to refer to the dollar amount that a risk represents. I use the term "value"
to refer to that dollar amount, but I recognize that it is an awkward choice. I will use the term "value" in
that manner throughout this Article.
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insurer will discount the value of the risk to reflect the fact that the insurer's
payment of the insured amount will be deductible for federal income tax
purposes. If the loss that was insured takes place, the amount of that loss in
excess of the value of the risk at the time that the premium was paid 62 reflects
the increase in the value of the risk while in the hands of the insurer. As a
consequence of that contract, the insurer is the person primarily responsible for
any losses that are covered by the insurance contract. The transfer of the risk to
the insurer is comparable to the transfer of the right to income in an
anticipation of income transaction.
The insured's payment of the premium does not mean that the insured
bears that amount of a loss that may subsequently arise. The insured bears the
loss of the premium payment regardless of whether the risk materializes. While
the amount of the premium is determined in part by the current value of the
risk, the premium does not represent a prepayment of a loss that may
subsequently occur. Illustrating that the premium is not a prepayment of a loss,
note that if the insured property is destroyed, the insured may be taxed on the
receipt of the insurance proceeds to the extent that the proceeds exceed the
basis of the property. No allowance is made for the premium paid by the
insured. So the loss that is incurred on the damage, destruction, or theft of the
property is a loss to the insurer, who has been paid to assume the primary risk
of that loss.
In contrast to the anticipation of income situation in which the assignor
has no further interest in the assigned income, the insured continues to bear a
risk for a loss incurred by the insured property, since the insured continues to
own that property. However, after the assignment, the insurer is primarily liable
for the loss, and the insured is only secondarily liable if the insurer defaults.
The transfer of primary liability for a loss to the insurer is sufficiently similar to
a purchased right to income to justify comparable treatment by the tax law.
Why then does the insured realize income when the insurance proceeds
exceed his basis in the property? As previously noted, the shifting of the
primary risk from the insured to the insurer means that the insured did not
receive the insurance proceeds as recompense for a loss that the insured
suffered. The loss was suffered by the insurer who had undertaken that risk for
a fee. But, since the insurer does not own the property, the only way that it can
bear the loss is to pay the owner of the property that amount of the loss. If the
insurer did not pay that amount to the owner, it would be the owner who bore
the risk of the loss, which would be contrary to their contractual arrangement.
Since the payment is made to the insured to fulfill the contract that the insurer
will bear the loss, the receipt by the insured is a return of the value of the
property that was lost. How then should that replacement of the lost value be
treated? To the extent that the amount received by the insured does not exceed
62
The portion of the premium that represents a payment for the service performed by the
insurer does not represent the present value of any part of the risk borne by the insured.
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his basis, it constitutes a return of the insured's capital and so is not income.
Any excess received by the insured is income.
Putting it another way, the insured's payment to the insurer for the latter
to assume a property risk that the insured otherwise would bear is analogous to
A's selling to B the right to dividends for a period of time. Just as B acquired
the right to the dividends so that A was not taxed thereon when they were paid,
so did the insurer acquire the risk of loss so that the insured is not the party
who should be deemed to have incurred that loss when the property is damaged
or stolen. The party who ultimately is required to bear the risk of loss is the one
who should be deemed to have incurred that loss in the absence of a default. In
that regard, consider the treatment in partnership taxation, where the
regulations determine which partner bears the economic risk of loss by
deeming the person liable for the loss, assuming all contractual obligations are
honored, to bear the risk.63
This same reasoning also applies to the justification for excluding liability
payments from an insured's income. 64 The purchase of liability insurance by
the insured shifts the risk of loss from the insured to the insurer. When the
insured causes an injury, the insured is liable to the injured parties for the
damage he causes. But the ultimate liability for these damages lies with the
insurer who had agreed to accept that risk. It is irrelevant to the tax treatment of
those payments that the insured is secondarily liable for these damage
payments if the insurer fails to fulfill its contract. The fact that the insured
could be required to pay the victims of his actions does not make the insured
the primary obligor, since the insured would be entitled to reimbursement from
primary obligor should be deemed
the insurer if he pays. For tax purposes, 6the
5
the person who ultimately bears the loss.
Now, let us consider liability insurance. Unlike the taxation of property
insurance when the insurance proceeds exceed the insured's basis, an insured's
benefit from an insurer's payment under a liability insurance contract does not
cause the insured to recognize income. The insurer's payment, whether made
as a reimbursement to the insured or as a direct payment to the injured party, is
a satisfaction of a liability that had been contractually shifted to the insurer.
Just as A, in the example above, is not taxed on dividend income the right to
which had been purchased by B, so should an insured not be taxed on the
insurer's satisfaction of a liability that is primarily that of the insurer. Consider

See Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(b)(1), (b)(3), (f)(ex. 4) (2008).
63
64
Commentators have struggled to come up with a policy justification for this treatment. See
BITTKER, MCMAHON & ZELENAK, supra note 44, 3.08[l][c] ("Yet another, more perplexing exception
to the Old Colony rule is the universally accepted exclusion by a taxpayer-tortfeasor of liability
insurance proceeds paid to a claimant plaintiff by the insurance company on the taxpayer's behalf. This
treatment is sanctioned by practice, even though there is no statutory provision or administrative or
judicial authority on point.").
65
Cf Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(b)(1), (b)(3), (f)(ex. 4) (2008).
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an analogous circumstance where an employee's negligence causes harm to a
third party who recovers damages from the employer. Even though the
employee also was
liable for the injury, the employer's payment is not income
66
to the employee.

Another way of looking at liability insurance is that the insurance
proceeds replace dollars that the insured either paid or can be deemed to have
paid to the victims. The replacement of dollars is equivalent to the replacement
of basis, and so does not cause the insured to realize any income. 67 Indeed, the

justification for excluding from income amounts received (1) on the sale of an
item, (2) as damages, or (3) as property insurance, to the extent these amounts
do not exceed basis, is that they are a return of the cash that the owner had
invested in the property. When the item
replaced is the cash itself, it is obvious
68
that it is not taxable to the recipient.
C. Clark and Its Progeny
69
Similar reasoning was used in the seminal case, Clark v. Commissioner,
a 1939 Board of Tax Appeals 70 case. The Clarks hired an "experienced tax

counsel" to prepare their income tax returns for 1932. The tax counsel advised

the Clarks to file a joint return for 1932 instead of two separate individual
returns. In 1934, the Clarks were audited by the Service and the revenue agent
estimated that the Clarks owed approximately $34,500 in additional taxes. The
underpayment was due to an error of the tax counsel and, after this error was
pointed out, it was determined that if the Clarks had filed separate individual
returns, they would have owed almost $20,000 less in taxes. In recognition of

his error (and as it was too late to alter the filing status of the Clarks), the tax

66 While the employer has a right to seek reimbursement from the employee, such rights are
hardly ever exercised.
67 See, e.g., Dodge, supra note 54, at 338-43. Professor Dodge states that the "only plausible
explanation [for excluding the insurance company payment from the insured's income] is that the
deemed payment by the insured is treated as a capital expenditure by the insured that is instantly offset
against the deemed receipt by the insured of the economic benefit of having a liability satisfied." Id. at
339 (emphasis added). Professor Dodge does not offer any explanation as to why the payment by the
insured would be a capital expenditure. Indeed, he does not actually claim that it is a capital expenditure.
Rather, he asserts that it is being treated as a capital expenditure since that is the only explanation he can
envision for the Service's exclusion of the insurance recovery from the insured's income. To the
contrary, in this Article, I have put forth a rationale for the exclusion of income that does not rest on the
determination that the insured's payment was a capital expenditure or otherwise created basis. Professor
Dodge is correct that the "netting [of the insurance proceeds with the payment to the injured party]
produces the correct tax outcome," id. at 343, but he does not provide any tax policy justification for the
creation of the basis and the resulting netting.
68
See Kahn, supra note 8, at 668 ("That is not to say that the taxpayer actually has a 'basis.'
One can have a basis only in non-cash tangible or intangible property. But, basis is comprised of dollars
that have been invested; and so the replacement of dollars is equivalent to a replacement of basis, both
of which represent a return of capital.").
69
40 B.T.A. 333 (1939), acq. in result, 1957-1 C.B. 3. The Service initially nonacquiesced to
Clark, 1939-2 C.B. 45, but reversed its position to acquiescence eighteen years later.
70 The Board of Tax Appeals was the predecessor of the current Tax Court.
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counsel offered
to pay the full difference to the Clarks, which the Clarks
71
accepted.
The Clarks did not report the payment from tax counsel as income on their
federal tax return. The Service argued that the amount should have been
included. The two sides had simple arguments. The Service argued that the tax
counsel essentially paid a tax liability of the Clarks, and thus the Clarks should
have included it in income. 72 On the other hand, the Clarks "contend[ed] that
this payment constituted compensation for damages or loss caused by the error
of tax"7counsel, and that [they] therefore realized no income from its receipt in
1934.
The Board of Tax Appeals held for the Clarks. Although the Service
acquiesced to the Clark decision in 1957, reversing its initial position of
nonacquiescence, 74 in recent years the Service has continually attempted to
minimize the scope of the Clark decision.
In 1992, the Service published Private Letter Ruling (PLR) 92-11-015.
The ruling was requested by a mutual fund inquiring into the tax consequences
of receiving a reimbursement from the insurance carrier of a certified public
accounting (CPA) firm. In three tax years, the fund failed to qualify as a
regulated investment company (RIC) on account of negligence by the CPA
firm. Due to that failure, the fund was required to file as a C corporation.75 The
failure to qualify as a RIC required the fund to pay more in federal taxes,
including penalties and interest, than it would have if it had qualified as a
76
RIG.
The CPA firm's liability insurance company reimbursed the fund for
those expenses, and the ruling addressed the issue of whether that
reimbursement constituted income to the fund.
In the ruling, the Service stated:
Whether the reimbursement is includible in Fund's gross income under section
61(a) of the Code depends on the nature of the recovery. Specifically, if the
reimbursement is a recovery of lost profits, it is includible in the Fund's gross
income. However, if the reimbursement is a replacement of Fund's capital, it is
not includible in Fund's gross income.... Payment by the one causing a loss
that does no more than restore a taxpayer to the position he or she was in before
the loss was incurred
is not includible in gross income because there is no
77
economic gain.
71
Clark, 40 B.T.A. at 334.
72
The Service specifically cited Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716
(1929), which held that when an employer pays the income tax owed by an employee, the employee has
income. Clark, 40 B.T.A. at 335.
73
Clark, 40 B.T.A. at 335.
74
1957-1 C.B. 4; see also Rev. Rul. 57-47, 1957-1 C.B. 23.
75
A C corporation is a corporation that is not taxed under Subchapter S. I.R.C. § 1361(a)(2)
(2000).
76
The fund incurred legal, accounting, and bank line-of-credit fees which were also
reimbursed by the CPA firm's insurance company. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-11-015 (Dec. 12, 1991).
77
Id.

Yale Journal on Regulation

Vol. 26:1, 2009

The Service, citing Clark, ruled that in the fund's case, the reimbursement
should be considered a nontaxable return of capital.78
However, in 1997 the Service reversed its position. In PLR 97-43-035, the
Service specifically revoked PLR 92-11-015 because "it is not in accord with
the current views of the Service." 79 The Service attempted to distinguish Clark
and the facts of a previously published ruling by stating:
In Clark and Rev. Rul. 57-47, the preparers' errors in filing returns or claiming

refunds caused the taxpayers to pay more than their minimum proper federal
income tax liabilities based on the underlying transactions for the years in
question. In this case, however, the CPA firm's error altered the underlying
entity status of the Fund. Fund incurred the minimum proper federal income
liability as a subchapter C corporation during the period it did not qualify as a
RIC. The CPA firm's reimbursement, unlike the reimbursements in Clark and
Rev. Rul. 57-47, was not made to compensate Fund for a tax liability in excess
of Fund's proper federal tax liability for the tax years relating to the firm's
negligence.
Instead, the reimbursement was a payment of Fund's proper tax
80
liability.

The Service, however, has not had much litigating success, and rightfully
so, with its attempt to apply Clark so narrowly. For example, Concord
Instruments Corporation v. Commissioner81 involved a taxpayer that had lost

an earlier tax court decision which increased its tax liability by $160,020. The
taxpayer had the right to appeal that decision, but its attorney failed to file a
timely notice of appeal. The taxpayer filed a claim against its counsel's liability
insurance on account of not filing the notice. The two parties settled the claim,
and the insurance company paid $125,000 to the taxpayer. The taxpayer did not
report this amount as income, a position with which the Service disagreed.
The taxpayer cited Clark in support of his position that the reimbursement
was a nontaxable return of capital. In the words of the court, the Service
attempted
to distinguish Clark on the grounds that in Clark the attorney's error
undisputedly caused the taxpayer to pay more taxes. The essence of
respondent's argument is that any error by petitioner's counsel was harmless
because petitioner's case was correctly decided by the Tax Court. Under that
assumption, any funds petitioner
received were an economic benefit and not
82
compensation for injury.

78 Id. The Service noted that some of the reimbursement could be taxable to the fund to the
extent that the fund was reimbursed for deductible expenses that had provided a tax benefit.
79 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-43-035 (July 28, 1997).
80 Id.; see also I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 98-33-007 (May 13, 1998) ("[Y]our payment of
additional federal income tax was not due to an error made by the attorneys on the return itself but on an
omission to provide advice that would have reduced your federal income tax liability. Thus, unlike the
situations in Clark and Rev. Rul. 57-47, you are not paying more than your minimum proper federal
income tax liability based on the transaction for the tax year to which the tax reimbursement relates.").
81
67 T.C.M. (CCH) 3036 (1994).
82 Id. at 3041-44.
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The court disagreed with the Service and held the amount nontaxable.
Basically, the court held that the amount represented a return of capital similar
to the amount paid to the Clarks. The fact that the two parties agreed that
$125,000 represented the amount of "damage"
caused by the attorney's
83
mistake should be respected by the Service.
More recently, the issue arose in a contract action by Centex Corporation
against the United States government. 84 Centex Corporation purchased certain
assets from the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation because of the
promise that specified tax benefits were tied to those assets. A few years later,
Congress passed legislation, with a retroactive effective date, that disallowed
those tax benefits. Because of the loss of the benefits, Centex was required to
pay additional federal taxes.
Centex sued the government for breach of contract in the amount of the
lost tax savings from the retroactive legislation. The court held for Centex in
the case and ruled that Centex paid approximately $55 million more than it
would have paid if the tax benefits had not been withdrawn.
Centex urged that the damage amount should be increased to account for
the fact that the recovery could be taxable to them. It is an interesting twist that,
in this circumstance, the government, citing Clark, argued that the amount
would not be taxable and thus no gross-up was required.
The court agreed with the government on the gross-up issue. The court
stated:
The judgment is not a replacement of lost income. Instead, plaintiffs are
receiving monies already subject to tax once before. Indeed the entire point of
the breach claim is that the judgment represents tax or penalties that, but for the
breach of contract, would not have been paid. The money that the plaintiffs
would have saved in the absence of a breach had, by definition, already been
taken into account for tax purposes. It follows that an award from this court to
compensate plaintiffs for the loss of that money is not subject to income tax. It
represents income already taxed.85
Generally, I agree with the reasoning of Clark. The Service's attempts to
limit the holding of Clark rightfully have been dismissed by the courts. As
discussed below, the Clark reasoning plays an important part in the discussion
of the appropriate tax treatment of tax insurance.

83 See Kahn, supra note 8, at 669 ("In my view, however, whatever figure the taxpayer and
the attorney's insurer agree upon ... should be accepted by the Service because it will be the product of
an arm's-length agreement. There is no risk of collusion in this circumstance, and the bona fides of such
an agreement are beyond question since the insurer has no extrinsic motives ... for settling the issue.").
84 Centex Corp. v. United States, 55 Fed. Cl. 381 (2003).
85 Id. at 389.
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Treatment of Tax Insurance Receipts

A. The Exclusion of Tax InsuranceReceiptsfrom Income
It appears that commentators and the insurance industry have taken the
view that tax insurance proceeds are taxable to the insured. 86 Contrary to the
majority view, I believe that such payments are nontaxable. The receipt of a
payment from an insurer for a portion of income taxes paid by the insured
pursuant to a tax insurance contract should be given the same tax treatment as
is accorded to insurance proceeds paid to reimburse the insured for damages
owed to a victim of the insured's negligence, and for the same reasons. The
purchase of tax insurance for a fee shifts the primary risk of a larger tax
liability from the insured to the insurer. If the insured's tax liability is greater
than the amount listed in the contract, it becomes a liability of the insurer.
Between the government and the insured, the insured is liable to the
government for the taxes. But this situation is the same as the case of a liability
owed by an insured to a third party for injuries caused by the insured's
negligence. Between the insured and the third party, the insured is liable to the
third party. The ultimate liability for the obligation to a victim or to the Service,
however, lies with the insurer in both cases.
By contract, the ultimate obligor for the tax is the insurer. The insurer's
payment to the insured is merely the circular means by which the insured bore
that obligation. The insured does not recognize income, because the payment
under the tax insurance contract replaces dollars that the insured paid to the
Service. As noted above, the replacement of dollars spent is equivalent to the
replacement of basis.
Essentially, this situation is similar to the facts of Clark and should follow
the same reasoning. That is, an insurance company is not paying the insured's
tax liability; it is reimbursing dollars spent by the insured and thus the
reimbursement should be treated as a return of capital. The difference between
the tax insurance situation and the Clark line of cases in which a tax advisor,
lawyer, or accountant makes a mistake is that the insurance company does not
cause the "loss" in the tax insurance situation. Instead, the insured pays the
insurance company to accept the risk that the Service may impose a greater tax.
The issue, then, is whether this difference suggests a policy justification
for a different tax result. The comparison to liability insurance is useful. The
insured pays a company to accept a possible future liability due to the insured's

86

See, e.g., Lawrence Zelenak, The Taxation of Tax Indemnity Payments: Recovery of

Capital and the Contours of Gross Income, 46 TAX L. REV. 381, 398 n.81 (1991) ("It is clear that any
tax audit insurance payments received by a taxpayer should be taxable under Old Colony. Since the tax
liability determined on audit is the correct liability based on the nontax facts, the taxes for which the
taxpayer is reimbursed cannot be characterized as a Clark-type excess tax loss."); see also Logue, supra
note 2, at 388; supra note 44 and accompanying text.

Hedging the IRS

actions. When the insurer is required to pay under the insurance contract, the
insured does not realize income. It does not matter that the insurance company
is not the party responsible for the loss.
The tax insurance contract is an arm's-length commercial arrangement in
which a risk or potential liability is shifted from one party to another who is
paid for undertaking the ultimate liability for that risk. Just as one can sell the
right to income, and thereby dispose of the tax liability for the subsequent
receipt of that income, so should one be able to transfer a potential liability by
paying another a fair fee for taking it over. In this regard, an insurer's
satisfaction of an insured's tax liability is no different in principle from
satisfying an insured's tort liability. The uncertainties of tax application, due to
the complexity of the tax system, make predicting how a transaction will be
taxed as speculative as is predicting the prospect of incurring a tort liability.
The tax insurance situation is distinguishable from the Old Colony87 case,
in which an employer agreed to pay the income taxes incurred by an
employee's receipt of salary from the employer. The employer's agreement to
pay those taxes was made as compensation for the employee's services and
constituted additional compensation to the employee. The additional
compensation was properly held by the Supreme Court to be income to the
employee.
One potential objection to not taxing reimbursements under tax insurance
is that the anticipation of income doctrine applies only to the sale of possible
gains, and the rationale for that concept should not be extended to permit the
transfer of potential losses. Congress has demonstrated that it wishes to prevent
the transferring of a deduction from one taxpayer to another. For example, in
the situation where a person makes a gift of property, the donee's basis in the
gift is determined by reference to the donor's basis at the time of the gift. 88
However, if the fair market value of the gift is less than the donor's basis at the
time of the gift (that is, if the property is a depreciated asset), then for loss
purposes the donee's basis is that lower fair market value. 89 The purpose of this
fair market value limitation to the transferor basis rule appears to be that
Congress desires to prevent taxpayers from transferring built-in losses and
90
thereby potentially transferring a deduction to a taxpayer in a higher bracket.
Could the same concern apply to tax insurance?
The comparison to the treatment of gifts of depreciated property is
inappropriate. The limitation on the basis rules for gifts is in place to block the
transfer of accrued deductible losses from one party to another. That is, the
Service does not look kindly on taxpayers transferring a built-in loss that has

87
88
89
90

Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 279 U.S. 716 (1929).
I.R.C. § 1015(a) (2000).
Id.
See S. REP. NO. 558, at33 (1934),as reprintedin 1939-1 C.B. 586,611-12.
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already occurred from one taxpayer to another. This rule is merely one aspect
of the congressional effort to prevent parties from trading in deductions. 9 1 Tax
insurance is entirely different. In the tax insurance situation, no built-in tax
deductions or losses are shifted from one person to another. What is transferred
is not a loss that has already occurred, but rather the risk of incurring future
losses. If the loss actually occurs, it arises during the period in which the
insurer primarily bears the risk-that is, the loss arises at a time when the
insurer is the one who is primarily responsible for it. 92 The concern behind the
limitation on basis for gifts does not apply in the tax insurance case and thus is
not relevant to the determination of how those insurance proceeds should be
treated.
In the case of tax insurance, the premium paid to the insurer represents a
cost to the insured. The dollar loss suffered by the insurer from accepting the
risk is the difference between the entire amount paid by the insurer (reduced for
income tax savings arising from the deduction of that payment) and the
premium it received from the insured. However, the premium paid by the
insured is not a prepayment of a portion of the tax liability because it is payable
regardless of whether the insured incurs any additional liability. The premium
is a fee for shifting the risk to the insurer.
B. Tax Insurance as Tax Abuse?
If the Service allows tax-free treatment for tax insurance receipts, is there
a potential for taxpayers to abuse the system to reach results inconsistent with
tax policy and specific rules? Professor Zelenak, in his article on tax indemnity
payments, raised that concern and used it 93to justify his conclusion that such
payments should be taxable to the recipient.
Consider the following example drawn from Professor Zelenak's article.
A wishes to sell his bond to B, and the bond will pay $100 on maturity. B is
willing to purchase the bond for $100 if it will provide B with a 10% return
after taxes. Assume B is taxed on all income at a 20% rate. If the interest on the
bond were taxable, A would be 94
required to pay a 12.5% interest rate to provide
return.
after-tax
10%
the
B with
Instead, A issues the bond to B but promises (erroneously) that the interest
on the bond will be tax-free. Later, B demands that A reimburse him for the $2

91

See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 269, 382, 482 (2000 & Supp. 2005).

92
In the gift situation, a donee is allowed to deduct a loss that occurs while the donee held the
gifted property. For example, assume A gifts Blackacre to B. A's basis in Blackacre is $5,000 and the
fair market value of Blackacre at the time of the gift is $2,000. B later sells Blackacre to C, an unrelated
person, for $1,000. While Code § 1015(a) disallows B from deducting the $3,000 loss that occurred
while A held Blackacre, B will be allowed to deduct the loss of $1,000 that occurred while B held
Blackacre.
93 Zelenak, supra note 86, at 398-99.
94
12.5 x 20% = 2.5. Thus, B's after tax return would be 12.5 - 2.5 = 10, or 10% ofS100.
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tax paid to get B to the desired after-tax return rate. If the reimbursement is
excluded from B's income, B will receive the desired 10% after-tax return and
it will only have cost A $12, or 12% of the bond, to achieve it. As noted by
Professor Zelenak, this reduces the cost to A, because if the parties had agreed
that it would be taxable from
the beginning, A would have been required to pay
5
$12.50 interest, or 12.5%.1
If the $2 is taxable to B, then A would be required to pay B $2.50 to get B
to the desired after-tax result. Thus, A would be required to pay a total of
$12.50, the same amount that A would have been required to pay if it was
acknowledged from the beginning that the interest would be taxable. 96 As
shown below, when analyzed properly, regardless of whether tax insurance is
excluded from income, the $2 payable by A is taxable to B.
While Professor Zelenak's example makes an interesting point, the
validity of his conclusion that resolution of his example requires that tax
insurance proceeds be taxable is doubtful. The problem he describes does not
exist in the case of a commercial insurer who is seeking profit on relieving an
insured of risk. The insurer has no motivation to insure an unrealistic tax goal
to provide the insured with a tax benefit or to induce the insured to engage in a
proposed transaction. Even if the payments made by A in the bond illustration
were held to be excluded from income, that situation has no bearing on the
proper tax treatment of tax insurance provided by a third party that has no other
interest in the transaction.
Moreover, even if, as I advocate, tax insurance payments from a third
party are excluded from income, and even in the unlikely event that the
guaranty of tax exclusion that A gave to B in Professor Zelenak's bond example
were found to be bona fide, the payments that A made to B in that example
should be included in B's gross income. A is not merely an insurer of B's tax
treatment. A is also a borrower 97 whose undertaking of an insurance role is
inextricably connected to his position as a borrower. The loan and the warranty
of tax treatment are so intertwined that one cannot be separated from the other.
In substance, A has agreed to pay additional interest equal to any higher tax that
B might be required to pay. Regardless of how the parties might seek to
characterize them, the payments should be treated as variable interest on that
debt. Obviously, the variable interest payments are included in B's gross
income. Consequently, there is no tax abuse in this situation.
The proper treatment of tax guaranties by a seller of a product is discussed
in Part IV below. Part IV also contains further discussion of the proper
treatment of the bond example.

95
Zelenak, supra note 86, at 399.
96
Id.
97 A's receipt of $100 from B is a loan to A on which interest is payable. The bond is a debt
instrument that shows the amount that the borrower, A, owes to the lender, B.
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Unless and until such unforeseen abuses actually become prevalent, it is
reasonable to leave their prevention to the operation of the substance versus
form doctrine under which the bona fides of a transaction can be challenged.
C. Tax Treatment of Premium Payments

Should the question of how the insured treats the premium payment for
tax purposes affect the insured's tax results when an insurer pays the additional

tax liability? In my opinion, the issue of the deductibility of the insurance
premiums should have no bearing on the ultimate determination of the correct

tax results for the insurer's payment. Similarly, the fact that the insurer's
satisfaction of tax liability is nontaxable to the insured should not dictate that
the premium payment is nondeductible, although this question may require
further exploration. At first glance, this treatment may seem inconsistent,
perhaps even whipsawing the Service. 98 Still, there are other situations that

produce comparable tax results. For example, when a business purchases
general liability insurance, the premiums are deductible to the business despite
the fact that should the insurance company cover a future liability under the
insurance contract, the insured does not have income.
Concluding that the tax treatment for one issue (the taxation of the tax

insurance proceeds) is not determinative of the other issue (the deductibility of
the premiums) does not answer the question of what the appropriate tax

treatment is for the insured's payment of the premiums. Although it is a close
question, and a strong case can be made that Congress should adopt a provision
denying a deduction on policy grounds, I conclude that such payments
should
99
be deductible by the insured under Code § 162 as currently written.
Initially, the issue appears fairly straightforward. Paying the insurance

premium is an ordinary and necessary business expense of the company and

98 Note that Code § 265(a)(1) does not apply to the tax insurance premiums. Code § 265
states that no deduction shall be allowed for "[a]ny amount otherwise allowable as a deduction which is
allocable to one or more classes of income other than interest (whether or not any amount of income of
that class or classes is received or accrued) wholly exempt from the taxes imposed by this subtitle .... "
This provision generally disallows deduction for life insurance premiums. BITTKER, MCMAHON &
ZELENAK, supra note 44, 11.10. However, the object of Code § 265(a)(1) is the situation where an
item of income is excluded from taxable income by a tax provision. Congress does not wish both to
exclude an item from taxable income and also allow a deduction for expenses incurred in producing that
income. The provision is aimed at preventing a double tax benefit. There is no reason to apply the
provision to expenses that produce an item which simply is not income as distinguished from an item of
income which is excluded from taxable income. For example, the provision has not been applied to
general liability insurance premiums, probably because those proceeds are not an item that is excluded
or deferred from income by any tax provision (unlike proceeds from life insurance, which are exempted
from income by Code § 101) but rather are simply not treated as income at all. The same reasoning
should apply to tax insurance premiums, and thus Code § 265 should not bar a deduction for such
premiums.
99 Code § 162 states, "There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business." I.R.C. § 162
(2000 & Supp. 2005).
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therefore is deductible under Code § 162.100 As noted above, companies deduct
insurance premiums when they buy general liability insurance, and the tax
insurance premium should not be treated differently.
Admittedly, there is a significant difference between general liability
insurance and tax insurance with regard to this issue. If a company had actually
paid damages instead of the insurance company's covering the payment, the
company payment would be deductible as a valid business expense. In contrast,
if the company had actually paid the additional
tax liability, it would not be
01
payment.1
that
of
cost
the
deduct
to
permitted
Does that difference require the conclusion that payment of the tax
insurance premium is nondeductible? The premium is not a prepayment of tax
liability. Instead the premium represents a genuine, ordinary and necessary
business expense and thus should be deductible under Code § 162.102 While the
present value of the tax liability payment is one of the elements used to
determine the premium charge, the payment represents the fair price of
transferring a business risk to an independent third party, similar to the
premium for liability insurance. The fact that the premium is a cost that the
insured incurs regardless of whether the insured incurs any additional tax
liability evidences that the premium is not a prepayment of a tax.
Why is a premium a business expense? One reason for acquiring tax
insurance is that the desirability of entering a business transaction may depend
upon how it will be treated by tax law: the taxpayer may not be willing to risk
suffering the business loss he will incur if an adverse tax treatment is imposed.
The premium then can be viewed as an expense of conducting a business
transaction.13
This conclusion becomes clearer when one focuses on the arrangement
from the perspective of the insurance company. What are the tax consequences
to the insurance company when it pays the insured's additional tax liability? As
°4
noted above, the payment of federal income tax is a nondeductible expense.,
However, the insurance company is not paying its own federal taxes; it is
covering a liability that it assumed as a business risk. Thus, the payment would
be deductible by the insurance company. Compare this tax treatment to the tax
results involving general liability insurance payments. When an insurance
company pays for damage caused by a client acting in a personal, nonbusiness
100

Id.

101
See I.R.C. § 164(a) (2000).
102
See supra note 99.
103
Depending on the type of transaction being insured, however, the cost of the insurance
may be required to be capitalized as part of the cost of an acquisition of a business or specific assets. See
BITTKER, MCMAHON & ZELENAK, supra note 44,
12.04 (stating that expenditures in investigating a
potential acquisition, as well as commissions, legal fees, and other expenses incurred in consummating
the transaction are also capital expenditures includable in the cost basis of the acquired assets, rather
than deductible expenses under Code §§ 162 or 212).
104
See BITTKER, MCMAHON & ZELENAK, supra note 44, 12.04.
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capacity, the insurance company still takes a deduction for paying the liability
even though the loss would not have been deductible by the insured if he had to
pay the damages. 10 5 Covering losses is the business of the insurance company,
and it does not matter to the insurance company whether the payment would be
deductible by the insured or not.
It might appear that this conclusion could lead to abuse. Taken to its
extreme, a business could use this reasoning to convert a nondeductible
expense into a deductible one. For example, a business could pay an insurance
company to assume the "risk" of its future tax liability in a situation where
there is very little doubt, if any, of what that liability will be. Thus, the
premium would be very close to the amount of the actual liability. Under the
above reasoning, the business could deduct the cost of the premium and the
insurance company could deduct the cost of paying the tax. Thus, the business
would be able to convert the federal tax liability payment into a deductible
expense.
This example is clearly distinguishable from the legitimate tax insurance
premium that involves a true shifting of a risk. Using a general substance over
form argument, the Service should be able to recharacterize the purported
insurance premium as the actual payment of the federal tax liability and thereby
disallow any deduction for it. A similar line of argument worked for the
10 6
Service in Helvering v. Le Gierse.
In Le Gierse, the issue was whether proceeds from a contract qualified as
"insurance" proceeds. 10 7 If so, the proceeds would have been excluded from the
decedent's gross estate under a then-existing statute exempting $40,000 of life
insurance proceeds. 10 8 Shortly before her death, the decedent purchased two
contracts from the Connecticut General Life Insurance Company and prepaid
the entire premiums for both. One contract was an annuity entitling the
decedent to approximately $590 per year as long as she lived. The cost of the
annuity was $4,179. The other contract was a life insurance policy that
provided for a $25,000 payment to the decedent's daughter. The premium for
the life insurance contract was $22,946. At the time that she executed the two
contracts and prepaid the premiums, the decedent was eighty years old. 10 9 The
subsequent annuity payments to be made to the insured would be offset by the
income earned on the insurance company's investment of the prepaid
premiums. So the only risk that the insurer would ever have less than $25,000

105
I.R.C. § 165(a)(I)-(2) (2000). The one exception for the nondeduction of personal losses
is the loss deduction allowed under Code §§ 165(c)(3) and (h) for casualty and theft losses. Those
deductions do not apply to liability damage payments by a tortfeasor.
106
312 U.S. 531 (1940).
107
Id. at 537.
108
Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 302(g), I.R.C. § 811 (g) (1940) (amended 1942, removing
$40,000 exclusion); see Le Gierse, 312 U.S. at 537-38.
109
Le Gierse, 312 U.S. at 536-37.
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in hand was an investment risk as to the amount of income that was earned
from investing the prepaid premiums.
The Court held that "[h]istorically and commonly insurance involves riskshifting and risk-distributing." 110 Since the decedent could not have acquired
the insurance policy without also purchasing the annuity, the Court considered
the two together. The Court determined that no actual risk had been shifted
from the decedent to the insurance company, and thus the $25,000 payment on
the insured's death did not qualify as insurance proceeds. As such, the proceeds
were not excluded from the decedent's estate.
This type of analysis has been used by other courts to determine whether
an instrument should be classified as insurance. 1 ' Using this same analysis, if
there has been no shifting of any significant risk, the coverage should not
qualify as insurance, and the payment should be viewed instead as an actual
nondeductible payment of the tax liability, using the insurer as an agent to
transmit the payment to the Service.
One objection to permitting both a deduction for tax insurance premiums
as well as excluding the insurance proceeds from income is that the
combination of tax treatments makes the purchase of tax insurance more
attractive than it otherwise would be. Consider whether, in principle, that
consequence differentiates tax insurance premiums from other deductible
items. For this purpose, assume that the tax insurance proceeds will be
excluded from income, as I concluded earlier in this Article.
How will the insurer determine the amount to charge as a premium for tax
insurance? The insurer will have made an evaluation of how much tax is at risk
and the likelihood that the tax will be imposed. That likelihood can be
represented by a percentage figure, which is little more than an educated
guess. 112 For example, assume X Corporation wishes to engage in a transaction
that it believes will produce $1.0 million of revenue. The insurer estimates that
there is a 25% chance that a 35% tax will be imposed on that $1.0 million and a
75% chance that the $1.0 million will not be taxed at all. Applying these
figures, the value of the pure risk that a 35% tax will be imposed is $87,500.113
The premium must cover more than the value of the risk. The insurer must
include in the premium an amount to pay for the clerical and administrative
expenses in issuing, overseeing, and making payment on the policy. In

110
Id.
at 539.
IIl
See Donald Arthur Winslow, Tax Avoidance and the Definition of Insurance: The
Continuing Examination of Captive Insurance Companies, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 79, 96 (1990)
("The courts have followed this analysis and found the absence of insurance where the company in
question did not assume an underwriting or economic risk. In addition, the risk must be substantial.").
112
See Sarah B. Lawsky, Probably? Understanding Tax Law's Uncertainty, 157 U. PA. L.
REv. (forthcoming Apr. 2009), availableat http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=
1161319.
113
(25% x $350,000) + (75% x 0) = $87,500.
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addition, the insurer will include an amount to provide it with a profit. Once
that figure is determined, the insurer likely will discount it to reflect that the
insurer's payment on the policy will be deductible, reducing the insurer's tax
liability. That discount may well reduce the premium to a figure that is less
than the value of the taxpayer's risk. Let us assume that the insurer has
determined that it needs to add $15,000 to the premium to pay for its costs and
provide a meaningful profit. That figure will be added to the value of the risk
undertaken, which is $87,500. The $87,500 figure arose from multiplying the
tax that would be due ($350,000) times the 25% estimated risk of occurrence.
However, if the insurer is required to pay the $350,000 tax, it will be allowed a
deduction for that payment. If we assume that the insurer will be in a 35%
income tax bracket, the after-tax cost to the insurer for making that payment is
$227,500.' 14 The risk to the insurer then is 25% times $227,500, or $56,875.
The premium then will be $56,875 plus $15,000 (the cost of administration
plus profit), or $71,875. It is significant that, because of the discount, the
premium charged for the tax insurance can be less than the value of the risk
that the insured is shifting to the insurer.
One objection to permitting a deduction for tax insurance premiums is that
the deduction makes the purchase of tax insurance more attractive than it
otherwise would be. In other words, the deduction creates a market
inefficiency, because more taxpayers will purchase the insurance than if no tax
deduction were allowable. Indeed, if a deduction is allowed, the after-tax cost
of the premium can be significantly less than the value of the risk that the
insured is shifting to the insurer. The nominal premium itself may already be
less than the value of the risk, since the insurer will have discounted it to reflect
the fact that any distribution under the policy will be deductible by the insurer.
One response to this objection is that a distortion of the market is not
particular to the purchase of tax insurance. The existence of an income tax
system necessarily creates market distortions. The allowance of a tax deduction
for an expense will reduce the cost of that expense and thereby distort the
market decision as to whether to incur the expense. For example, the allowance
of a deduction for entertainment and travel expenses influences the decision to
engage in such activities and the amount expended on them.1 5 It is not possible
to eliminate all of the market distortions caused by the tax system. In those
cases in which the market distortion is deemed especially undesirable because
it conflicts with social or economic policies, Congress will modify a provision.
These modifications occur only in special circumstances. For example, Code
§ 132(f)(4) prevents the application of the constructive receipt doctrine when
an employee has the option of choosing between accepting a qualified

114
115

$350,000 x 65%.
See, e.g., I U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY AND

ECONOMIC GROWTH 84-85 (1984) (stating that proposals to limit deductions for business meals and
entertainment expenses will reduce demand for expensive meals and various forms of entertainment).
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transportation fringe benefit or cash compensation. To deter the offering of that
choice would encourage more employees to drive to work, which conflicts with
environmental concerns. 16
Does the fact that allowing deductions for tax insurance premiums
encourages purchasing this insurance require that no deduction be allowed?
There is no policy reason to consider the purchase of tax insurance to be
harmful to the public, and so its purchase should not be discouraged. To the
contrary, the purchase of tax insurance can facilitate the engagement of
investments that are beneficial to society and should perhaps be encouraged.
Rejecting tax insurance premium deductions would have to rest on the
determination that the resulting encouragement to the decision to purchase such
insurance conflicts with some non-tax policy. The determination of whether
such a conflicting policy exists and whether it is of sufficient concern to
warrant changing the tax law should be left to Congress. In my view, the
purchase of tax insurance is beneficial to society and does not contravene any
non-tax policies.
IV. Seller's Guaranty of Income Tax Treatment
A. In General

To induce a buyer to purchase an investment, a seller may guaranty the
buyer that the tax treatment of the investment will accord with a specified
prediction. If the investor's tax liability is greater than the guarantied amount,
and the seller pays the difference to the buyer, how should the Service treat
these payments for tax purposes?
Part of the nominal purchase price for the investment can be seen as a
payment for the transfer of the tax risk from the buyer to the seller. In that
respect, the situation appears to be the same as the one described above for the
purchase of tax insurance from a commercial insurer, and one might expect the
tax treatment to be the same. There is, however, a countervailing consideration
in this case that leads to an entirely different tax result.
The guaranty by the seller is not made independently of his role as a seller
of a product. As noted above in discussing the bond example of Professor
Zelenak, the seller's role as an insurer is inexorably bound to his role as a
seller. Any payments made by the seller pursuant to that guaranty should be
treated as a reduction of the purchase price paid by the buyer rather than as
insurance proceeds. While the payments would nevertheless not be taxable to
the buyer, they would reduce the buyer's basis in his investment. The payments

116
See S. Rep. No. 105-33, at 198 (1997) ("[T]he election to take cash may promote sound
energy policy by increasing the use of mass transit and reduce the amount of commuting by car.").
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should not be treated as a reimbursement of the taxes paid by the buyer (an
insurance or Clark-type treatment), but rather should be treated as a reduction
of the purchase price. In the unlikely circumstance that the payments under the
guaranty should exceed the purchase price, that excess should be income to the
buyer. It is windfall income and is taxable.
Consider the comparable situation that arises on the cancellation of debt.
G purchases a building from K for $500,000. G pays K $100,000 and gives K
his promissory note, bearing adequate interest, in the amount of $400,000,
secured by the building. Subsequently, because of G's financial difficulties
(although assume G is not insolvent), K agrees to cancel $50,000 of the debt
and accepts a new note from G for $350,000 in substitution of the old $400,000
note. The common law treatment of cancelling $50,000 of G's debt was that it
was not income to G, but rather constituted a reduction of his purchase price
for the building to $450,000. Congress codified that result in Code § 108(e)(5).
The underlying rationale for this treatment is that K's role as a creditor cannot
be separated from K's role as a seller. So, when K cancels $50,000 of G's debt,
he effectively is reducing the selling price of the building. The same tax
treatment should be accorded a payment made by K pursuant to a guaranty of
any nature, including a guaranty of tax consequences.
Consider the very different tax consequence if G had financed the
purchase of the building by obtaining a loan from the Friendly Bank for
$400,000, secured by the building, instead of obtaining a purchase money loan
from K. If the Bank subsequently forgave $50,000 of the $400,000 debt owed
by G, the forgiveness could not be viewed as a reduction of the purchase price,
since the Bank is not the seller.' 17 Consequently, unless G was insolvent,
11 8 the
$50,000 cancellation of the debt would be included in G's gross income.
In sum, it is my view that payments made by a seller pursuant to a tax
guaranty should be treated not as insurance proceeds, but rather as a reduction
of the purchase price.
How, then, does this conclusion apply to Professor Zelenak's bond
example discussed in Part III? In that illustration, the payments made by A
pursuant to the guaranty appear more as variable interest on the bond rather
than as a reduction of the price paid for the bond. It is a factual issue, but
making payments periodically as each year's tax bill becomes due has all the
characteristics of interest payments, rather than those of periodic reductions of
the purchase price. But what if the payments are treated as reductions of the
purchase price? What would be the tax consequence of that treatment?
If the payments under the guaranty are treated as a reduction of B's
purchase price for the bond, the payments would be treated as a return of B's

117
See Rev. Rul. 92-99, 1992-2 C.B. 35. But see Freedom Newspapers, Inc. v. Comm'r, 36
T.C.M. (CCH) 1755 (1977).
118
Cf. Preslar v. Comm'r, 167 F.3d 1323 (10th Cir. 1999) (stating that forgiveness of loan
could not be nontaxable purchase-price adjustment since the bank was not the seller of the property).
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capital and so would not be taxed to him. Since it is not taxable, does that mean
that the result of this characterization is the same as the one described by
Professor Zelenak, which resulted in a tax abuse? The answer is that a
reduction of purchase price has very different tax consequences than those that
attend a treatment of the payments as tax insurance proceeds. Unlike the
insurance or Clark-type payment, the return of capital would reduce B's basis
in the bond. Thus, in the first year, when the $2 payment is made to B, 119 B's
basis in the bond would decrease from $100 to $98. The effect of this reduction
would be that B would recognize a $2 gain when the bond is redeemed. Each
year thereafter, the bond's basis would be reduced another $2. The reduction of
basis will ultimately be taxable to B, either as ordinary income on the
redemption of the bond or periodically as original issue discount (OLD). This
may cause headaches for B because it will alter the yield of the investment and
perhaps subject B to the OlD provisions.
How can my conclusion that a payment pursuant to a seller's tax guaranty
reduces the purchase or investment price be reconciled with the Clark
decision? If I am correct, why were the payments made by the attorney in
Clark not treated as a reduction of the attorney's fee? The answer is that Clark
was a damages case. The attorney made an error that caused injury to the
Clarks by causing them to pay higher taxes than would have been required. The
attorney reimbursed the Clarks for the injury that the attorney caused regardless
of whether the attorney's error gave rise to legal liability. In contrast, the
payments made by a seller pursuant to a tax guaranty are not made to reimburse
the buyer for some injury that the seller caused. Instead, those payments are
made pursuant to a guaranty that was part of the investment contract.
Note that the proper characterization of payments made pursuant to a
seller's guaranty has no bearing on the treatment of commercial tax insurance
proceeds. Since the tax insurance contract is separate from the actual
transaction, the insurer's payment cannot be recharacterized as either additional
investment income (such as variable rate interest) or as a reduction of the cost
of the investment. The commercial tax insurance policy is not an element of the
insured transaction any more than G's mortgage debt to the Friendly Bank in
the illustration above is connected to the actual purchase price of the building.
Given that a tax payment by a seller pursuant to a guaranty will reduce the
purchase price, there does not appear to be any tax benefit for the buyer and
seller to conspire by purporting to include a guaranty in the sale. In effect, the
buyer would pay a higher nominal price, the excess of which will be returned
to him periodically. There is no reason, then, to tax such payments to prevent
the potential for collusive arrangements when there is no tax advantage to be
gained from those arrangements.
119
In Professor Zelenak's illustration, the additional tax payable each year on the interest
from the bond was $2. Zelenak, supra note 86, at 399.
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B. Specific Treatment of Old Market "Insurance"
What does this analysis tell us about the taxation of old market tax
indemnity arrangements? The discussion above is applicable to all three types
of old market tax indemnity vehicles: (1) tax return preparers' warranties; (2)
warranties by tax advisors; and (3) standard tax indemnity agreements between
purchasers and sellers.
First, consider the treatment of a warranty by a tax return preparer. As
noted above, tax return preparers often indemnify clients for any interest or
penalty imposed by the Service that is caused by an error of the tax return
preparer. If the tax return preparer reimburses a client under such a warranty,
what is the tax treatment? Initially, one is tempted to deal with the tax
treatment of the warranty payment similarly to the treatment of a seller's
guaranty discussed above. That is, the warranty insurance is an integral part of
the package offered by the tax return preparer, and thus the payment could be
viewed as a refund of the fee charged for the tax preparation service.
On the other hand, the warranty payment is similar for tax purposes to the
payment made in Clark.That is, the tax return preparer reimburses the taxpayer
for an expense that the taxpayer would not otherwise have incurred except for a
mistake by the preparer. The payment is a form of damages. Even if the error
would not cause a liability in the absence of a warranty, the payment is made to
replace a loss that was caused by the tax preparer's error. Thus, the Clark
reasoning should apply and the payment should be considered a nontaxable
return of capital.
Does it make a difference for tax purposes whether the payment is treated
as a recovery of capital under the reasoning of Clark or as a refund of the
preparation fee? Initially, the tax results appear similar, since both lead to the
result that the payment is merely a recovery of capital and therefore not
taxable. However, there are two important differences. First, if the payment is
considered a refund of the service charge, the exclusion would apply only up to
the amount of the preparation charge. Any payment in excess of the service fee
would be income to the taxpayer. It is possible, depending on the severity of
the mistake, that the warranty payment could exceed the tax return preparation
fee. On the other hand, if the warranty payment is viewed as the payment in
Clark, the payment cannot exceed the amount paid out since the tax return
preparer is reimbursing the taxpayer for money paid to the Service. Thus, the
taxpayer will not have any income from the payment.
Second, if the payment is considered a refund of the tax preparation fee,
the tax benefit rule could require the taxpayer to include the entire warranty
reimbursement in income. Tax preparation fees are deductible under Code
§ 212(3). If the taxpayer had taken a deduction for the fees and that deduction
provided a tax benefit, then the refund of that amount would require the
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taxpayer to recognize income to offset the previous deduction. 120 The tax
benefit rule has no bearing if the insurance proceeds are treated as a Clark
payment since tax liability interest and penalties are not deductible.
This discussion addresses the difficulty of drawing the line between
payments that are characterized as a variable return (such as the variable
interest in the bond hypothetical) or as a reduction in the cost of the property,
and payments that should be characterized under the reasoning of Clark.
Professor Zelenak argued that Clark should apply only when there is a "loss"when, based on the "nontax facts," the taxpayer "could not have paid any less
tax." 12 1 Professor Zelenak's characterization is similar to the Service's position
and suffers from the same flaws. The Clark logic applies whenever the
payment reimburses the recipient for additional incurred costs due to an error
that the preparer made. The additional costs constitute a "loss" of funds of the
recipient, and so the payments are in the nature of damages.
Tax return preparers may also offer audit insurance for an additional fee.
Typically, these agreements provide that for a one-time fee, based on the
complexity of the tax return, the tax return preparer agrees to represent the
taxpayer without charge should the client be audited by the Service. On the one
hand, this arrangement appears simply to be a prepayment of a fixed fee for
representing the client. However, the payment also has a strong element of
insurance. The amount charged by the accountant is usually much less than the
value of the services should they be required because the accountant plans to
sell the same insurance to a large pool of taxpayers. Thus, the taxpayer is
paying the accountant to bear the risk of the taxpayer's having a controversy
with the Service. As with general liability insurance and tax insurance, since
the accountant now bears the primary risk, the insured should not have any tax
consequence if the taxpayer is audited by the Service and thus has the tax
return preparer provide services under the agreement. Similar reasoning applies
to medical insurance. That is, a taxpayer does not have income even though the
value of medical services received exceeded medical insurance premiums paid.
Instead, the medical insurance premium was the price paid by the taxpayer to
shift the risk of future medical liabilities to the insurance company.
Different reasoning applies to the warranty agreements provided by tax
advisors. The warranty should be considered an integral part of the bargain to
return their fee if their advice is faulty, and thus any payment made under that
warranty should be considered a refund of the charged fees. Indeed, the
arrangement is characterized this way by the parties. A taxpayer should
recognize income from such refunds only to the extent that the tax benefit rule
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Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Comm'r, 460 U.S. 370(1983); see also I.R.C. § 111 (2000).
Zelenak, supra note 86, at 398 ("If the tax liability was as low as possible, based on the

actual nontax facts, none of the tax should be characterized as a Clark-type excess tax loss; without that
loss characterization, the cases are governed by Old Colony and the payments are taxable.").
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applies or the payment amount exceeds the service charge (because of interest
on the fee, for example). The fact that the Service has expressed its hostility
toward such refund arrangements through Circular 230 and the list of
reportable transactions 122 should have no bearing on the tax treatment of the
refund itself. The Service has taken steps to deter abusive transactions, and
requiring disclosure of reportable transactions is one method it uses to
accomplish that goal. The apparent purpose of the Circular 230 rule, which
applies only to advice regarding the taxpayer's original return as contrasted to
an amended return, is to deter questionable positions from being taken in the
hope that the return will not be audited by the Service-that is, playing the
audit lottery.
Finally, as discussed above, the tax treatment of the standard tax
indemnity agreement between a purchaser and a seller should be treated as a
mere retroactive change in the price of the assets sold.
V. Broker's or Agent's Guaranty of Income Tax Treatment
A broker, agent, or similar party 123 can obtain a fee for facilitating the
purchase of an investment. Typically, the fee is paid by the seller of the
investment. While these agents are not employees of the seller, they do have a
financial interest in having the purchase take place. In some cases, in order to
induce the investor to make the investment, an agent may guaranty to a
potential investor that the investment will yield specified tax consequences.
What are the tax consequences of an investor's receipt of a payment from the
agent pursuant to that guaranty? Of all the old and new market arrangements,
this situation is the most difficult to characterize for tax purposes.
The agent's guaranty was not made in a vacuum. It obviously is connected
to the investment and to the agent's fee. But, it is difficult to treat a payment on
the guaranty as a reduction of the agent's fee or as a reduction of the
investment since the investor did not pay the agent's fee (directly) and the
agent did not sell the investment or receive the purchase price. In determining
the proper treatment of such payments to the investor, it is helpful to look at an
analogous situation that can arise in connection with a cancellation of debt.
As previously noted, if a purchase money debt is reduced, it is treated as
the reduction of the purchase price of the property. However, if a third party
financed the purchase, the cancellation of any of that debt will not reduce the
purchase price and is treated as a cancellation of indebtedness governed by the
provisions of Code § 108.124
There is one Tax Court memorandum decision that supports the
possibility that the payment by the agent might qualify as a reduction of the
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See supra Part I.A.
1will refer to such parties collectively as an "agent."
See Preslar v. Comm'r, 167 F.3d 1323 (10th Cir. 1999); Rev. Rul. 92-99, 1992-2 C.B. 35.
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investment made by the investor. In Freedom Newspapers, Inc. v.
25
a broker induced the taxpayer to purchase a package of four
Commissioner,1
newspapers, including one that the taxpayer did not wish to buy, by promising
to resell the unwanted newspaper or pay the taxpayer $100,000 if the broker
failed to make that sale. The broker did fail to sell the unwanted paper and so
paid the taxpayer $100,000. The Tax Court held that the broker's guaranty was
so tied to the investment of the taxpayer that it had to be included as an
integrated element of the transaction. Accordingly, the Tax Court held that the
$100,000 payment that the taxpayer received constituted a reduction of the
purchase price for the unwanted newspaper, and so reduced the taxpayer's
basis rather than causing income recognition.
The application of the Freedom Newspapers holding is likely to be limited
to circumstances where the agent who reimbursed the taxpayer played a
significant role in the transaction in which the acquisition was made. t1 6 It is
possible that this approach would be applied to an agent's tax guarantee, but
only up to the amount that the agent was paid to facilitate
then it should apply
27
the transaction. 1
It also seems incorrect to treat the agent's payment as a payment made
pursuant to a tax insurance contract. The guaranty is too closely connected to
the investment to be regarded as independent of it. Yet, viscerally, it seems
harsh to tax the investor on the receipt of a payment from the agent. Perhaps
the apparent inappropriateness of taxing the investor on that amount will lead a
court to adopt the approach that the Tax Court took in the Freedom
Newspapers case as long as the agent played a significant role in the original
transaction.
VI. Conclusion
It is ironic that there is uncertainty about the tax liability attending a
product meant to mitigate or eliminate the uncertainty over the ultimate tax
treatment that will be applied to a business transaction. This uncertainty has an
effect on the number and cost of tax insurance policies issued. This Article
explored the question of how tax insurance proceeds should be treated by the

125
36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1755 (1977), action on dec., 1978-62 (Jan. 19, 1978).
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See I.R.S. Action on Dec. 1978-62 (Jan. 19, 1978) ("[The agent] was intimately involved
in the sale of the newspapers .... [The agent], as the broker negotiating the sale, cannot be viewed as an
independent third party to the transaction. The amount of commission [the agent] received on the sale
had a direct impact upon the cost to petitioner, hence on his basis in the property."); see also I.R.S. Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 2007-43-003 (July 25, 2007) ("The payment in Freedom Newspapers clearly related back to
the original purchase of the underlying asset because the payment was made pursuant to an agreement
entered into at the time of the purchase, and the taxpayer would not have purchased the asset in the
absence of the agreement.").
See I.R.S. Action on Dec. 1978-62 (Jan. 19, 1978) (noting that the agent's commission for
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the completed sale was in excess of one million dollars).
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tax law and how they are likely to be treated. I concluded that there is a strong
and valid reason not to tax those proceeds by making an analogy to the
anticipation of income doctrine. In addition, when tax insurance is acquired to
deal with the tax consequences of a business venture, the premiums payable for
that insurance are deductible as business expenses under current tax principles.
Accepting these conclusions should lead to the issuance of more tax insurance
policies, which could also increase the number of transactions that otherwise
would not have occurred because of tax treatment uncertainty.
The importance of resolving tax insurance's tax treatment is not confined
solely to the realm of tax insurance, however. I examined several types of tax
indemnification arrangements and analyzed how their tax treatment would be
affected by the exclusion of tax insurance proceeds. Exploring these related
fields provides a richer understanding of the full impact of excluding tax
insurance proceeds from income.

